HOW SIGNIFICANT WAS ALEXANDER DUBCEK IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REFORMIST COMMUNISM?
demanding that it meet July 22 or 23 with the Soviet Politburo in Moscow,
Kiev or Lvov to discuss internal Czechoslovak developments. 9 full members
of the CPSU Politburo and the entire CPCS Presidium met on July 29 in the
Slovak village Cierna-nad-Tisou. Dubcek and the other reformats regarded
the outcome of the Cierna talks as a ‘Czechoslovak victory’. It had brought
the annulment of the Warsaw Letter; the departure of Soviet troops was
guaranteed, and the country’s sovereignty had been defended.[15]
The fact that the agreement was regarded as the ‘victory’ shows that
Dubcek and the other reformers were really driven by naпvetй and idealism
and hoped that they could create the socialism with the ‘human face’
without the interference from the Moscow side. They really underestimated
their own significance to the Soviets. Moscow regarded the reformats
developments in the Czechoslovakia as the real threat for the future of the
all Communist Bloc. A common view that the danger of a Czechoslovak
desertion from the socialist camp and a revision of foreign policy by the
Dubcek leadership hastened the Soviet decision to occupy the country
militarily.[16]
The Invasion.
On August 16 the CPSU Politburo stated that “the CPCS was loosing its
leading role in the country.”[17] This showed that the Soviet’s patience
reached the end.
“When Moscow’s nerve breaks, Soviet tanks usually start rolling.”[18]
Armed forces of the SU, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria invaded
Czechoslovakia in a swift military action during the night of August 20-21.
Dubcek and other Czech and Slovak leaders were arrested in the name of the
“revolutionary government of the workers and peasants.”[19] The main force
of the initial invading units consisted of an estimated 200,000 troops. The
number of invaders continued to increase during the following week and
ultimately reached an estimated 650,000.[20]Most of the members of the CPCS
Presidium were shocked by the invasion. This proves again that they did not
understand how serious the situation was before the invasion. From the
Moscow’s point of view the invasion was inevitable, because the further
development of the socialism with the ‘human face’ would lead only to
deeper escalation of tensions between the Czechoslovakia and the other WTO
countries, and probably, to an escape of the country from the Communist
Bloc.
But the reformats did not give up. On August 21, the CPCS Central
Committee declared the statement that the invasion was taking place
“without the knowledge” of the Czechoslovak leaders, and that they regarded
this act “as contrary not only to the fundamental principles of relations
between Socialist states but also as contrary to the principles of
international law.”[21]Although there was no organised resistance to the
overwhelming occupation forces, Czechoslovak citizens, spearheaded by
students, resorted to a wide variety of means to hamper the invaders, and
several general strikes took place.[22]
On August 23, President Svoboda flew to Moscow. His journey
represented an effort to find a way out of a situation: he was, in effect,
trying to help the Soviets find a solution for the Czechoslovak crisis
based on mutual political compromise.[23]On August 26 the Moscow agreement
was concluded. The major outcomes were: (1) Dubcek was to carry on as the
First Secretary; (2) the invasion forces were to be gradually withdrawn;
(3) censorship was to be reintroduced; (4) the CPCS was to strengthen its
leading position in the state.[24]One may assume that certain personnel
changes were also assumed in Moscow, since resignations followed in due
course. These changes included the removal of Dr. Kriegel from the CPCS
Presidium and the chairmanship of the National Front; of Ota Sik as Deputy
Premier; Josef Pavel as Minister of Interior; Jiri Hajek as Foreign
Minister; Zdenek Heizar as Director of Czechoslovak Radio; Jiri Pelikan as
Director of Czehoslovak Television.[25]
The invasion led to the formulation of so-called Brezhnev Doctrine,
first formulated in a Pravda commentary on September 26, which amounts to
denying in principle the sovereignty of any “socialist” country accessible
to the SU. It asserts the region-wide right to intervention.[26]
For both rulers and ruled, the invasion of Czechoslovakia proved once
again that the Soviets would use force to prevent developments they defined
as contrary to their vital interests. The line they drew in 1968 to define
their vital interests was the Leninist hegemony of the local Communist
Party.[27]
But the Soviets did not achieved what they wanted at once. What
happened was that the invasion failed to achieve its primary purpose, which
clearly was to produce a counterregime a la Kadar.[28]
The Situation After the Invasion.
The Dubcek leadership made great efforts after the invasion to
satisfy the Soviets while trying not to compromise itself in the eyes of
the population.[29]
Probably the major reform after the invasion was the creation of the
Slovak Socialist Republic. On October 28, the National Assembly approved a
constitutional bill transforming the hitherto unitary state into a
federation of two national republics. On January 1, 1969, the Slovak
Socialist Republic came into being.
Another crisis emerged in January 1969. On January 7, the new
measures were taken designed to keep the press and the other media more
strictly under control. In some cases, pre-publication censorship was
reintroduced.[30]
The event which finally decided the fate of Dubcek is known as the
‘ice-hockey game affair.’ On March 28, the Czechoslovak ice-hockey team won
over the SU team in World Ice Hockey Championship Competition. The same
evening anti-Soviet demonstrations occurred throughout Czechoslovakia.
Aeroflot office was destroyed in Prague. On April 11 Gustav Husak declared
that it was ‘high time’ to take radical steps to introduce order.[31]
Finally, on April 17 at the plenary session of the Central Committee
Dubcek was replaced by Gustav Husak (before that - the First Secretary of
the Slovak Communist Party).
At the same session the CPCS Presidium with its twenty-one members
and the Executive Committee with its eight members were replaced by an
eleven members Presidium of which Dubcek (but no longer Smrkovsky) was
still member. A few days later he was ‘elected’ Chairman of the Federal
Assembly with Smrkovsky as his deputy.
On January 28, 1970, the Central Committee plenum ‘accepted the
resignation’ of Dubcek from the Central Committee. And finally, on June 25,
1970 at the session of the Central Committee he was expelled from the CPCS.
This was the end of his political career. But only until the end of the
Communism regime in 1989. At the end of December 1989 he was elected
Chairman of the Czech parliament.
Conclusion: Was the Reformist Communism Ever Possible?
The primary goal of Dubcek’s reforms was the creation of the
socialism with a ‘human face’. Broadly speaking, the Czechoslovak reformers
sought an adjustment of the standard Soviet model of socialism to the
realities of what they considered an advanced industrialised socialist
country enjoying a tradition of democracy and humanitarianism.[32]The
stated opinions of the reformers could be summed as follows: (1) the CPCS
should no longer maintain a monopoly of power and decision making; (2) it
should rather prove its goals through equal competition by permitting a
clash of ideas and interests; (3) the abandonment of this monopoly would in
effect mean a sharing of power and permit criticism, opposition, and even
control on the CPCS’s own exercise of power.[33]Of course, Dubcek was
against the creation of the opposition parties, but he was for the
pluralism inside the National Front. The essence of his reform conception
was not the possibility of pluralism in the accepted sense but, rather, the
obligation upon the CPCS to prove that its program was the only valid one
for socialism.[34]
It was very naive to consider that Moscow will remain indifferent to
such developments. Gradually the Soviets understood that the reformers are
not controlling the reforms, and this led to the invasion. The Soviet
interests were threatened almost exclusively by developments inside the
Czechoslovakia. In other words, precisely by that ‘human face’ which Dubcek
wanted to give Czechoslovak socialism.[35]
There was one thing which Dubcek considered to be not important, but
in fact, this led to the end of the reforms. He underestimated the impact
of his own reforms upon Moscow. The Soviet reaction to the reforms was
quite logical and inevitable. The Communist power elite would never have
accepted conditions which would make the free play of political forces
possible. It would never given up the power.[36]
So, was Dubcek significant in developing the reformist communism? In
the short term - yes, but in the long term the practical meaning of his
reforms was nil. All the things he reformed were returned back. The only
positive impact (in the long term) of the reforms was the psychological
impact of the attempt to improve the improvable thing. Communism can not be
reformed. The only way to change it is to overthrow it completely. There is
no way in the middle. The reformist communism is simply an utopia.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Ames, K., ‘Reform and Reaction’, in Problems of Communism, 1968, Vol.
17, No. 6, pp.38-49
2. Devlin, K., ‘The New Crisis in European Communism’, in Problems of
Communism, 1968, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp.57-68
3. Golan, G., ‘The Road to Reform’, in Problems of Communism, 1971, Vol.
20, No. 3, pp.11-21
4. Golan, G., ‘Innovations in the Model of the Socialism: Political Reforms
in Czechoslovakia, 1968’, in Shapiro, J.P. and Potichnyj, P.J. (eds.),
Change and Adaptation in Soviet and East European Politics (New York,
Washington, London: Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp.77-94
5. Lowenthal, R., ‘The Sparrow in the Cage’, in Problems of Communism,
1968, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp.2-28
6. Mastny, V., (ed.), Czechoslovakia: Crisis in World Communism (New York:
Facts on File, Inc., 1972)
7. Provaznik, J., ‘The Politics of Retrenchment’, in Problems of Communism,
1969, Vol. 18, No. 4-5, pp.2-16
8. Sik, O., ‘The Economic Impact of Stalinism’, in Problems of Communism,
1971, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp.1-10
9. Simons, Th.W., Eastern Europe in the Postwar World, (2nd. ed., London:
Macmillan, 1993)
10. Svitak, I., The Czechoslovak Experiment: 1968-1969 (New York and
London: Columbia University Press, 1971)
11. Tigrid, P., Why Dubcek Fell (London: Macdonald, 1971)
12. White, St., Batt, J. and Lewis, P.J. (eds.), Developments in East
European Politics (London: Macmillan, 1993)
-----------------------
[1]Tigrid, P., Why Dubcek Fell (London: Macdonald, 1971), p.17
[2]Sik, O., ‘The Economic Impact of Stalinism’, in Problems of Communism,
1971, Vol. 20, No. 3, p.5
[3]Golan, G., ‘The Road to Reform’, in Problems of Communism, 1971, Vol.
20, No. 3, p.12
[4]Ibid., p.13
[5]Ibid., p.11
[6]Tigrid, P., op.cit., p.19
[7]Ibid., p.30
[8]Ibid., p.43
[9]Mastny, V., (ed.), Czechoslovakia: Crisis in World Communism (New York:
Facts on File, Inc., 1972), p.21
[10]Tigrid, P., op.cit., p.48
[11]Ames, K., ‘Reform and Reaction’, in Problems of Communism, 1968, Vol.
17, No. 6, p.48
[12]Tigrid, P. op.cit., p.57
[13]Mastny, V., op.cit., p.37
[14]Ibid., p.40
[15]Tigrid, P., op.cit., p.89
[16]Ibid., p.53
[17]Ibid., p.69
[18]Ibid., p.53
[19]Svitak, I., The Czechoslovak Experiment 1968-1969 (New York and London:
Columbia University Press, 1971), p.109
[20]Mastny, V., op.cit., p.69
[21]Ibid., p.71
[22]Ibid., p.76
[23]Provaznik, J., ‘The Politics of Retrenchment’, in Problems of
Communism, 1969, Vol. 18, No. 4-5, p.3
[24]Svitak, I., op.cit., p.109
[25]Provaznik, J., op.cit., p.4
[26]Lowenthal, R., ‘The Sparrow in the Cage’, in Problems of Communism,
1968, Vol. 17, No. 6, p.24
[27]Simons, Th.W., Eastern Europe in the Postwar World (2nd. ed., London:
Macmillan, 1993), p.124
[28]Devlin, K., ‘The New Crisis in European Communism’, in Problems of
Communism, 1968, Vol.17, No. 6, p.61
[29]Tigrid, P., op.cit., p.138
[30]Ibid., p.153
[31]Ibid., p.164
[32]Golan, G., ‘Inovations in the Model of Socialism: Political Reforms in
Czechoslovakia, 1968’, in Shapiro, J.P. and Potichnyj, P.J. (eds.), Change
and Adaptation in Soviet and East European Politics (New York, Washington,
London: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p.78
[33]Ibid., p.81
[34]Ibid., p.87
[35]Tigrid, P., op.cit., p.66
[36]Ibid., p.98
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