HOW SIGNIFICANT WAS ALEXANDER DUBCEK IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REFORMIST COMMUNISM?

HOW SIGNIFICANT WAS ALEXANDER DUBCEK IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REFORMIST COMMUNISM?

THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS

The Politics of Eastern Europe

HOW SIGNIFICANT WAS ALEXANDER DUBCEK

IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REFORMIST COMMUNISM?

By:

Jonas Daniliauskas

Tutor:

T.P. McNeill

March 17, 1995

The Introduction.

The aim of this essay is to answer the question: “How significant was

Alexander Dubcek in the development of reformist communism?” This question

raises the other questions. Was Dubcek the inspirer of all the reforms

which took place in Czechoslovakia in 1967-1969? How much did he himself

influence all the reformist processes? How much he had achieved in

implementing his ideas?

Dubcek became famous only in 1967. Before that he was almost unknown

in the international politics. He was known only in the Czechoslovak

Communist Party (CPCS), where he had almost no influence on the major

decisions (until 1967, of course). His promotion after the returning from

the Moscow where he was studying for three years in the advanced Party

school attached to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union (CPSU), was quite rapid. In 1960 he was elected to the

Secretariat of the CPCS; in 1962 to the Presidium of the CPCS; in 1963 he

became the First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party; finally, on

January 5, 1968 he replaced Antonin Novotny as the First Secretary of the

CPCS. He was the youngest leader of ruling Communist Party (after Fidel

Castro), and the first Slovak in such a high position. Though he stayed in

this post relatively short - until April 17, 1969, when he was replaced by

Gustav Husak, his name became known world-wide.

Why did the reforms begin?

The Czechoslovak crisis deepened in 1967, and showed itself in four

spheres:[1]

1. Slovakia;

2. The economy;

3. The legal system;

4. Party and ideology.

Since the 1962 the Czechoslovak economy suddenly began to show signs

of a critical decline. That happened inevitably, because in the Stalin

years the expansion of heavy industry was pushed at the expense of

development of all other productive sectors of the economy. The result of

this was growing inefficiency of production, failure to modernise

production technology, a decline in the quality of exports, a loss of

markets, and a drop in the effectiveness of foreign trade.[2] In August

1962 the Third-Five-Year Plan had to be abandoned before completion.[3] In

this situation the Slovaks began to act. Many of them realised that

specific Slovak interests might best be served by destalinization and even

liberalisation.[4] The problem also was the rehabilitation of the victims

of the purge trials of 1949-1954. Novotny himself and other leading members

of his regime had personally participated in the preparation and conduct of

the purge trials. So, the rehabilitation was perceived as the direct threat

to the security and the survival of the regime.[5] All these factors only

decreased the level of CPCS’s legitimacy.

The Development of Reforms.

The startpoint of the reforms was the session of the Central

Committee of the CPCS on October 30-31, 1967. Dubcek raised an objection

against Novotny and produced statistics suggesting that Slovakia was being

continuously cheated in economic matters.[6] This speech inspired

discussion what was the unprecedented thing in the Central Committee.

The next session of the Central Committee started on December 19.

Josef Smrkovsky proposed the separation of the posts of President and First

Secretary: “It is unsatisfactory that an excessive number of duties should

be piled upon one pair of shoulders.”[7]

In both sessions the three issues were at stake. First, the

implementation of the economic reforms, secondly, freedom of expression

and, finally, effective autonomy for Slovakia.

Finally, at the Central Committee Plenum on January 5, 1968, Novotny

was replaced at the post of the First Secretary by Dubcek. Also four new

Presidium members were elected to strengthen Dubcek’s position - J.Spacek,

J.Boruvka, E.Rigo, and J.Piller.

So, the Prague Spring started at the top levels of the CPCS. But

soon, as we would see, the Party will loose its ability to control the

developments. At the same time, the hot political debate started in the

press, on radio and television. The main issues were the Communist Party,

democracy, the autonomy of Slovakia, the collapsing economy, and the

problem of justice and legality.[8] On February 14, the first public

political discussion took place in Prague.

The next changes in the leadership were Novotny’s resignation from

the Presidency on March 22 and General Ludvik Svoboda’s election on this

post on March 30, Oldrich Ciernik’s appointment on the post of Prime

Minister and the formation of the new cabinet on April 8, the election of

the new Presidium of the CPCS, and the election of Josef Smrkovsky on the

post of the Chairman of the National Assembly.

On April 9, the CPCS announced its ‘Action Programme’, officially

known as ‘Czechoslovakia’s Road to Socialism’, as a basis for reforming

communism in the country. In this document the CPCS promised: (1) new

guarantees of freedom of speech, press, assembly and religious observance;

(2) electoral laws to provide a broader choice of candidates, greater

freedom for the four non-communist parties within the National Front; (3)

upgrading of the parliament and the government with regard to the power of

the CPCS apparatus; (4) broad economic reforms to give enterprises greater

independence, to achieve a convertible currency, to revive a limited amount

of private enterprise and to increase trade with Western countries; (5) an

independent judiciary; (6) federal status for Slovakia on an independent

basis and a new constitution to be drafted by the end of 1969.[9] The

Central Committee also pledged a “full and just rehabilitation of all

persons” who had been unjustly persecuted during 1949 -1954.

But this programme promised less than the people actually wanted. The

‘Action Programme’ remained outside the mainstream of the powerful social

process which had been set in motion in January.[10] The people expected

more reforms, more freedom. But Dubcek and other reformats tried to be more

moderate, to find the way for the gradual reforms. The Presidium of the

CPCS prohibited the renovation of the Social Democratic Party and the

Ministry of Interior announced that the formation of political parties

would be considered illegal. But at the same time this Ministry sanctioned

the activity of the Club of Engaged Non-Party Members (KAN), and recognised

the legal statute of another big club - K-231.

Gradually the reformats found themselves in the position which will

become vital for them all. They found themselves between two different

forces. One force was the majority of the Czech and the Slovak nations who

wanted more radical changes. The other force was represented by the

Stalinists, by Moscow, and by the leadership of the other countries of the

Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO).

One of the major reforms was the law of June 26, which abolished

prepublication censorship. On the next day the famous manifesto, entitled

‘2,000 Words to Workers, Farmers, Scientists, Artists and Everyone’

appeared in Literarni listy. The manifesto gave assurances of complete

support of Dubcek’s regime, “if necessary, even with arms.”[11]

The leaders of the SU, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and East Germany

viewed the reforms taking place in Czechoslovakia as the threat for all the

Communist Bloc. The first clearly expressed concern was so-called Warsaw

Letter. It was sent on July 15, 1968, and addressed to the Central

Committee of the CPCS. It proved the clear evidence of the WTO leaders’

lack of confidence in the leadership of the CPCS, and contained critical

references to Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy.[12]There was expressed

warning that the Czechoslovak reform policy was ‘completely

unacceptable’.[13]The Presidium of the CPCS Central Committee on July 18

rejected as unfounded the accusations made in the Warsaw Letter and

affirmed that the country’s new policies were aimed at strengthening

socialism.[14]

The clear signs of crisis in relations between Prague and Moscow

appeared. On July 19 Moscow issued a summons to the CPCS Presidium,

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