Effects of deflation

b>4.2 Keynesian economics

Keynesians insist on the distinction between consuming goods and producing goods, and between government based and credit based money supply.

For a given money supply, if wages rise faster than productivity, profits will fall and with them the price of producing goods (deflation), while consuming goods will rise (inflation). This happens in times when labor supply is tight and bargaining power is strong. When wages rise slower than productivity, profits rise as do the prices of assets relative to consuming goods. This can occur when labor supply is great and bargaining power is weak.

Inflation and deflation occur when the economic policies allow wages to increase or decrease at differing rates than productivity. Wages rising faster than productivity lead to inflation. Wages failing to increase at the rate of productivity for protracted periods will ultimately cause deflation.

Indeed, if growth continues despite lagging wages, it is because of debt accumulation, producers lend to wage earning consumers part of their profits, in order to sell their products. For protracted periods, there is a lot of endogenous money creation.

Then, when debt payments exceed the borrower's ability to pay, debt accumulation and endogenous money creation stops, demand and goods' prices fall, manufacturers reduce production, employment falls, and fewer borrowers are thus able to pay their debts, and the cycle exacerbates.

Once preventive action has failed, Keynesians advocate corrective action. In case of debt deflation, Keynesians advocate "pump priming" or government creation of fiat money. As witnessed since 1990 in Japan, and in the 1930s in the USA, this policy is not very effective unless government creates employment via public works projects or military manufacturing.

Austrians and Keynesians agree on the idea that there are counterproductive cycles of booms and bust but while the former believe the government tends to be a cause of those cycles, the latter believe it is a means to reduce the size of those cycles.

5. Historical examples

5.1 In Ireland

In February 2009, Ireland's Central Statistics Office announced that during January 2009, the country experienced deflation, with prices falling by 0.1% from the same time in 2008. This is the first time deflation has hit the Irish economy since 1960. Overall consumer prices decreased by 1.7% in the month.

Brian Lenihan, Ireland's Minister for Finance, mentioned deflation in an interview with RTЙ Radio. According to RTЙ's account, "Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan has said that deflation must be taken into account when Budget cuts in child benefit, public sector pay and professional fees are being considered. Mr Lenihan said month-on-month there has been a 6.6% decline in the cost of living this year" [9].

This interview is notable in that the deflation referred to is not discernibly regarded negatively by the Minister in the interview. The Minister mentions the deflation as an item of data helpful to the arguments for a cut in certain benefits. The alleged economic harm caused by deflation is not alluded to or mentioned by this member of government. This is a notable example of deflation in the modern era being discussed by a senior financial Minister without any mention of how it might be avoided, or whether it should be.

5.2 In Japan

Deflation started in the early 1990s. The Bank of Japan and the government tried to eliminate it by reducing interest rates, but this was unsuccessful for over a decade. In July 2006, the zero-rate policy was ended.

Systemic reasons for deflation in Japan can be said to include:

Unfavorable demographics. Japan has an aging population: 22.6% over age 65 that is not growing and will soon start a long decline. The Japanese death rate recently exceeded the birth rate [6].

Fallen asset prices. In the case of Japan asset price deflation was a mean reversion or correction back to the price level that prevailed before the asset bubble. There was a rather large price bubble in equities and especially real estate in Japan in the 1980s [20].

Insolvent companies: Banks lent to companies and individuals that invested in real estate. When real estate values dropped, these loans could not be paid. The banks could try to collect on the collateral (land), but this wouldn't pay off the loan. Banks delayed that decision, hoping asset prices would improve. These delays were allowed by national banking regulators. Some banks made even more loans to these companies that are used to service the debt they already had. This continuing process is known as maintaining an "unrealized loss", and until the assets are completely revalued and/or sold off, it will continue to be a deflationary force in the economy. Improving bankruptcy law, land transfer law, and tax law have been suggested (by The Economist) as methods to speed this process and thus end the deflation.

Insolvent banks: Banks with a larger percentage of their loans which are "non-performing", that is to say, they are not receiving payments on them, but have not yet written them off, cannot lend more money; they must increase their cash reserves to cover the bad loans.

Fear of insolvent banks: Japanese people are afraid that banks will collapse so they prefer to buy Treasury bonds instead of saving their money in a bank account. This likewise means the money is not available for lending and therefore economic growth. This means that the savings rate depresses consumption, but does not appear in the economy in an efficient form to spur new investment. People also save by owning real estate, further slowing growth, since it inflates land prices.

Imported deflation: Japan imports Chinese and other countries' inexpensive consumable goods (due to lower wages and fast growth in those countries) and inexpensive raw materials, many of which reached all time real price minimums in the early 2000s. Thus, prices of imported products are decreasing. Domestic producers must match these prices in order to remain competitive. This decreases prices for many things in the economy, and thus is deflationary.

In November 2009 Japan has returned to deflation, according to the Wall Street Journal. Bloomberg L.P. reports that consumer prices fell in October 2009 by a near record 2.2% [20].

4.3 In the United States

There have been three significant periods of deflation in the United States.

The first was the recession of the late 1830s, following the Panic of 1837, when the currency in the United States contracted by about 30%, a contraction which is only matched by the Great Depression. This "deflation" satisfies both definitions, that of a decrease in prices and a decrease in the available quantity of money.

The second was after the Civil War, sometimes called The Great Deflation. It was possibly spurred by return to a gold standard, retiring paper money printed during the Civil War.

"The Great Sag of 1873-96 could be near the top of the list. Its scope was global. It featured cost-cutting and productivity-enhancing technologies. It flummoxed the experts with its persistence, and it resisted attempts by politicians to understand it, let alone reverse it. It delivered a generation's worth of rising bond prices, as well as the usual losses to unwary creditors via defaults and early calls. Between 1875 and 1896, according to Milton Friedman, prices fell in the United States by 1.7% a year, and in Britain by 0.8% a year [18].

The third was between 1930-1933 when the rate of deflation was approximately 10 percent; part of the United States' slide into the Great Depression, where banks failed and unemployment peaked at 25%.

The deflation of the Great Depression, as in 1836, did not begin because of any sudden rise or surplus in output. It occurred because there was an enormous contraction of credit (money), bankruptcies creating an environment where cash was in frantic demand, and the Federal Reserve did not adequately accommodate that demand, so banks toppled one-by-one. From the standpoint of the Fisher equation, there was a concomitant drop both in money supply and the velocity of money which was so profound that price deflation took hold despite the increases in money supply spurred by the Federal Reserve.

Throughout the history of the United States, inflation has approached zero and dipped below for short periods of time (negative inflation is deflation). This was quite common in the 19th century and in the 20th century before World War II.

Some economists believe the United States may be currently experiencing deflation as part of the financial crisis of 2007-2010; compare the theory of debt-deflation. Year-on-year, consumer prices dropped for six months in a row to end-August 2009, largely due to a steep decline in energy prices.

Consumer prices dropped 1 percent in October, 2008. This was the largest one-month fall in prices in the US since at least 1947. That record was again broken in November, 2008 with a 1.7% decline. In response, the Federal Reserve decided to continue cutting interest rates, down to a near-zero range as of December 16, 2008 [18]. In late 2008 and early 2009, some economists feared the US could enter a deflationary spiral. Economist Nouriel Roubini predicted that the United States would enter a deflationary recession, and coined the term "stag-deflation" to describe it [19]. It is the opposite of stagflation, which was the main fear during the spring and summer of 2008. The United States then began experiencing measurable deflation, steadily decreasing from the first measured deflation of - 0.38% in March, to July's deflation rate of - 2.10%. On the wage front, in October 2009 the state of Colorado announced that its state minimum wage, which is indexed to inflation, is set to be cut, which would be the first time a state has cut its minimum wage since 1938 [19].

6. Conclusion

Whereas policy makers today speak of the need to avoid deflation their assessment is colored by the experience of the bad deflation of the 1930s, and its spread internationally, and the ongoing deflation in Japan. Hence, not only do policy makers worry about deflation proper they also worry about its spread on a global scale.

If ideology can blind policymakers to introducing necessary reforms then the second lesson from history is that, once entrenched, expectations of deflation may be difficult to reverse. The occasional fall in aggregate prices is unlikely to significantly affect longer-term expectations of inflation. This is especially true if the monetary authority is independent from political control, and if the central bank is required to meet some kind of inflation objective. Indeed, many analysts have repeatedly suggested the need to introduce an inflation target for Japan. While the Japanese have responded by stating that inflation targeting alone is incapable of helping the economy escape from deflation, the Bank of Japan's stubborn refusal to adopt such a monetary policy strategy signals an unwillingness to commit to a different monetary policy strategy. Hence, expectations are even more unlikely to be influenced by other policies ostensibly meant to reverse the course of Japanese prices. The Federal Reserve, of course, does not have a formal inflation target but has repeatedly stated that its policies are meant to control inflation within a 0-3% band. Whether formal versus informal inflation targets represent substantially different monetary policy strategies continues to be debated, though the growing popularity of this type of monetary policy strategy suggests that it greatly assists in anchoring expectations of inflation.

7. References

1. Borio, Claudio, and Andrew Filardo. "Back to the Future? Assessing the Deflation Record." Bank for International Settlements, March 2004.

2. Burdekin, Richard C.K., and Pierre L. Siklos. "Fears of Deflation and Policy Responses Then and Now." In Deflation: Current and Historical Perspectives, edited by Richard C.K. Burdekin and Pierre L. Siklos. New York: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

3. Brezina Corona. How Deflation Works? Rosen Young Adult, 2007.225p.

4. Capie, Forrest, and Geoffrey Wood. "Price Change, Financial Stability, and the British Economy, 1870-1939." In Deflation: Current and Historical Perspectives, edited by Richard C.K. Burdekin and Pierre L. Siklos. New York: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

5. Charles Stanton Devas. Political Economy. LLC, 2009.310p.

6. "Deflation", http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deflation

7. Friedman, Milton, and Anna J. Schwartz. Monetary Trends in the United States and the United Kingdom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.

8. Humphrey, Thomas M. "The Real Bills Doctrine." Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review 68, no.5, 1982.

9. Hummel, Jeffrey Rogers. "Death and Taxes, Including Inflation: the Public versus Economists", 2000.

10. International Monetary Fund. "Deflation: Determinants, Risks, and Policy Options "Findings of an Independent Task Force." April 30, 2003.

11. John Harold Wood. A history of central banking in Great Britain and the United States. Cambridge University Press, 2005.439p.

12. Krugman, Paul. "Its Back: Japan's Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (1998): 137-205.

13. Meltzer, Allan H. A History of the Federal Reserve. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2003.

14. Milton Friedman, Anna Jacobson Schwartz. A monetary history of the United States, 1867-1960. Princeton University Press book, 1971.860p. http://books.google.ru/books? id=Q7J_EUM3RfoC&printsec=frontcover&dq=related: ISBN0521837995&lr=#v=onepage&q&f=false

15. Siklos, Pierre. "Deflation". EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples. May 11, 2004. URL http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/siklos.deflation

16. Siklos, Pierre. "Deflation". EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples. May 11, 2004. URL http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/siklos.deflation

17. Robert Samuelson. "The specter of deflation". November 11, 2008, http://articles.ocregister.com/2008-11-11/opinion/24737155_1_deflation-consumer-prices-mild-inflation

18. Richard C.K. Burdekin. Deflation. Current and Historical Perspectives. Cambridge University Press, 2004.340p.

19. Randall E. Parker. Reflections on the Great Depression. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002.230p.

20. Thomas F. Cargill, Michael M. Hutchison, Takatoshi Itф. Financial policy and central banking in Japan. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000.196p. http://books.google.ru/books? id=gt6UBd0UXXUC&printsec=frontcover&dq=related: ISBN0521837995&lr=#v=onepage&q&f=false

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